or the other would seem to have been the
necessary qualification. An instance of the
first was the appearance of Tisagras in
behalf of his brother Miltiades, who, being
himself too ill to speak, was carried into
court on a litter; of the last, the famous
speech of Demosthenes, "De Coronâ," in
defence of Ctesiphon, who was accused of
having illegally proposed to present the
orator with a golden crown. One other
class of cases there was, in which, to judge
from Lucian, litigants were allowed
professional assistance — when they were too
drunk to speak for themselves.

A peculiar class at Athens were the
logographers — men who devoted themselves to
composing speeches which were afterwards
delivered in court by others, after the
fashion of our courts-martial. In this way
Demosthenes himself was at first employed.
He wrote one for Phormio, which all his
relations came to court in a body to deliver.
It began with an apology for Phormio's
notorious incompetency to make a speech
for himself. In this case Demosthenes
further signalised himself by writing the
speech for the other side also: a feat
which recals the ingenious essayist, who,
on a reward being offered to the writer
who should upset certain arguments in a
startling controversial pamphlet of his
which had just appeared, wrote another
and answered them himself. One of the
most celebrated of logographers was
Antiphon, who deserves an immortality for
good or evil for having been the first
lawyer who took money for his work.
Among its great discoverers, the world
should not forget the inventor of fees. The
practice of fee-taking extended rapidly, as
was not unnatural, among the speakers of
speeches as well as the writers; and once
treated as the legitimate means of turning
an honest obol, advocacy may be fairly
said to have entered upon a recognised
professional existence.

If this discovery of Antiphon's was an
epoch in advocacy, the leading case of
Phryne, already cited, marked another.
After her trial it appears to have occurred
with some force to the authorities that
there might have been a miscarriage of
justice, and that it seemed scarcely reasonable
or judicial to acquit a young lady of a
charge of impiety because she looked so
well with nothing on. Her case, therefore,
led to the passing of the first recorded law
that limited the discretion and regulated
the conduct of advocates, who in later
times, especially in Rome under the
empire and afterwards in France, were
frequently subjected, both as to their duties
and their privileges, to legislative
interference of this kind. In England, as is
well known, the bar is governed by its own
rules only, being a body as irresponsible as
it was in its origin indefinite : a very
dignified position, no doubt, and one which
squares well with M. le Berquier's theory.
But the curious in the secrets of the prison-
house might find in some of the mischievous
and puerile regulations of the code that the
lawyers have constructed for themselves,
on the simple principle of mutual mistrust,
reason to doubt whether they are a class
whom it is advisable to leave altogether to
themselves. This is not the place,
however, to discuss the ethics of legal trades-
unionism. The law which grew out of
Phryne's case was simple and effective.
All oratorical tricks, calculated to move
pity or indignation, were forbidden ; and
the judges were enjoined not to look
at the accused during a criminal trial
if anything of the kind were attempted.
"This rule," says D'Argis, "did much
chill the eloquence of the Greek
orators." Speakers were also ordered to
confine themselves within the bounds
of modesty ; not to attempt to gain
the private ear of the judges ; not to raise
the same point twice ; to refrain from
abusive language, and from stamping of
the feet ; not to speak to the judges when
considering their judgment ; and not to
make a noise on leaving the court, or
collect a crowd round them. Fifty drachmas
was the lowest penalty for disobedience to
any of these rules, some of which, in their
primitive simplicity, might have been
framed for a pack of unruly schoolboys,
while others would be invaluable even at
the present day. We may compare with
them, in more modern times, a series of
rules prescribed for the guidance of the
"advocates of parliament" in the time
of Philip the Fair. They were warned
not to undertake just and unjust causes
without distinction, or support their
arguments by fallacies or misquotations ; not
to abuse the opposite party or his counsel ;
not to be absent from court when their cause
was called on (mark that, ye Q.C.'s) ; not
to be disrespectful to the court, or greedy
of fees. Finally, they were not to lead
immoral lives, or (these were the days of
chivalry) refuse their services to the poor
and oppressed. From an old book called
the Stylus Parliamenti the advocate may
get yet more valuable hints ; for he will