droughts, is declared by the natives to have
resulted from an exactly contrary cause— an
excess of rain, which caused inundation, and
washed away the crops. But one of the worst
of these visitations was that of 1837-38, when
it is considered probable that no less than eight
hundred thousand persons perished of starvation.
It is with the famine of this period that
Colonel Smith compares that of 1860-61, and it
is from the result of that comparison that we
are enabled to draw the cheering conclusions at
which we have arrived. The two areas which
he has compared are much the same in extent,
and it appears that other things were equal
enough during the two periods to warrant the
anticipation of similar effects from similar causes.
But although the conditions during the former
period were in almost every respect more
favourable, the mortality was far greater, and the
amount of general suffering must have been
immensely in excess of that of 1860-61. Food
during that former period was at an average
price, in the worst localities, of twelve and a
half seers for a rupee, or twenty-five pounds for
two shillings, according to English computation;
while in the worst localities in the latter
period the same sum of money purchased only
from seventeen to nineteen pounds. This is the
surest indication that the former famine was
not so great in its pressure as the latter, and
yet its victims were far more numerous! In
the former period, too, there were signs of
disorganisation of society such as have had no
existence in the latter. Every exertion was
made in 1837-38 to alleviate the general
distress, as in 1860-61. Many thousands of
persons were employed upon extraordinary public
works, and the government remitted a large
amount of revenue, while private subscriptions
were raised to a considerable extent. But,
notwithstanding every exertion, it was found
impossible in many parts to preserve order.
Driven to desperation by starvation, large
bodies of the population gathered into bands
for plunder, attacking the grain stores, and
carrying off their contents. Disorganisation,
indeed, threatened to become general, and could
only be repressed by force. Troops had to be
employed upon some occasions, and during the
whole period of the famine it was found necessary
to maintain a largely augmented body of
police, both horse and foot. Of such
disorganisation as this, Colonel Smith tells us, there
has been no sign during the famine of 1860-61,
nor has the amount of revenue remitted been
anything comparable. It is evident that during
the intervening period society had, by some
means, been strengthened, and had become
better able to resist the effects of the scourge.
Of this there is abundant proof in the improved
condition of the smaller proprietors. In 1837-38
they suffered in common with the humblest
tillers of the soil. Landlords as well as labourers
perished of starvation, or were reduced to
pauperism along with them. And this,
notwithstanding that they still held their lands. But
these lands were useless to their owners unless
the owners could keep them in cultivation.
They could not sell them, for nobody would
buy them. They could not mortgage them, for
nobody would lend money upon them. The
average selling price in 1837 was at one year's
rent, or about a third more than the amount of
the government demand on the total area sold.
This was the rate when sales could be effected
at all; but it may easily be supposed that in
time of distress they would be generally out of
the question. And this state of things was
owing not so much to any unbearable pressure
of taxation, although that was bad enough, as
to the uncertainty of the tenure, and the
knowledge that it was in the power of government to
increase the demand from time to time, and to
throw any burden upon the soil that it pleased.

In 1860-61, notwithstanding that food was
higher, and the general conditions less favourable,
the mortality was far less; there was no
social disorganisation, and the small proprietors
generally managed to tide over their difficulties.
Land, which, as we have seen, in the former
period was worth only a third more than the
government demand upon it, had in the latter
period risen to five times the revenue, which is
its present rate. The total amount of the land
revenue in 1837-39, in those parts of the North-
West and Delhi territory under long settlements,
was, in round numbers, three and a half
millions sterling; the value of the land was somewhat
more than four and a half millions. In
the succeeding twenty-four years the value of
the land having risen to five times the amount
of the former public demand, or to seventeen
and a half millions; the wealth of the
landowners is shown to be augmented by no less a
sum than thirteen millions.

The direct cause of this happy change is
undoubtedly the improved system of land revenue
settlement in operation since the famine of
1837-38, or rather the successful working of a
system which had then but recently been
enacted. When the North- West Provinces first
came under British rule, Lord Wellesley
promised that the Permanent Settlement, as
introduced by Lord Cornwallis into Bengal, should
be extended to them. This Permanent Settlement
has its friends and its enemies, like most
other things. It was granted by Lord
Cornwallis with the object of raising the position of
the cultivators by the encouragement or, we
may almost say, the creation— of an upper class
who should be responsible to the government
for the revenue, which revenue being assessed
at a certain rate in perpetuity, would give the
proprietor the benefit of all improvements, and
through him, it was hoped, benefit the cultivator
in a proportionate degree. Nothing appears more
fair than such an arrangement. It was certainly
a most liberal one on the part of the government;
but though considered by many to involve an
unnecessary sacrifice of state interests, it has
proved successful in its working, and the
government have no reason to object to it, though
it has been found generally distasteful to the
subordinate official mind. The great objection