It was considered that the personal interest
involved would so colour such testimony, as
to make it valueless; that the temptation to
perjury would be almost irresistible.
However, it was felt that it was a perfect absurdity
to exclude the evidence of the two leading agents
in the transaction, and to shut out the stories
of the injured and injuring parties—perhaps
the only two persons who could really throw any
light on the transaction. Even going back
to the primitive Rousseau state of nature
principle, it was felt that the wise mystery-
man, or chief, sitting under his tree, or even
Solomon in his temple, would first call the
complaining party before him, and hear his narrative,
and then hear the defending party; and
then listen to neighbours and accept statements
in corroboration or refutation. As to danger of
perjury, a personal statement would need to be
fortified from other sources: and there was
always the danger before false swearing, of
contradiction arising out of the truth, and of severe
and searching cross-examination. If no moral
sense restrain, there are the pains and penalties
of an indictment for perjury suspended like
a Damocles' sword over tne witness-box.

The real inconsistency of the law, in having
gone thus far and no farther, will be evident from
the fact that many civil trials become virtually
criminal trials, and that a plaintiff or defendant
may be changed into an accused, and examined,
as it were, in the dock, on charges involving his
liberty and life. Thus, an ejectment may have
been brought against some family to try the
title to the estates—an ejectment founded on a
concocted case, on forged deeds, wills, or parish
registers. The plaintiff in such an action may
be cross-examined on these criminal acts, and on
his own testimony subjected to penalties and
punishment. The case of the Reverend Mr. Hatch
is fresh in the public memory. He himself was
in the dock, and his mouth was therefore closed.
But afterwards he indicted the prosecutrix for
perjury; and with a change of positions, he going
into the witness-box and she into the dock, he
was enabled by his own testimony, which he was
before prevented from offering, to convict her of
perjury. The getting at justice by such accidents
as these, should surely not be part of a
system which boasts itself the perfection of
human reason. Appealing, again, to the elementary
stages of society, it will be found that the
conduct of the master of a family, on any heinous
dereliction in such family, is based on a more
obvious and rational plan. He sends forthwith
for the culprit, servant or offspring, to his study,
and asks him boldly what he can say for
himself? He does not call Jeames, or Tummus, or
Charley, or Jack, before him and sternly refuse
to accept any but direct proof from third parties
concerning the alleged delinquency of Jeames,
Tummus, Charley, or Jack. He examines Jeames,
Tummus, Charley, or Jack. If the supposed
culprit make fair, open, candid statements, and
bear a little cross-examination without being
shaken, he will be dismissed "without a stain
on his character." If, on the contrary, Mary
Anne has been out "without leave," and bolsters
up her case with a falsehood, the terrible engine
of cross-examination will break Mary Anne down.

The advantage of such a change in our criminal
procedure may be looked at in two ways,
namely, in confounding the guilty, and in aiding
the innocent to clear themselves. What would
be the great yearning in the heart of an innocent
man charged with a criminal offence? It would
be a hungering after speech, a sense of bursting
with suppressed vindication, a longing to be
allowed to speak out, and explain how all
occurred. When a witness mentions a fact
apparently damaging, how easily could a word
from him explain it away. But his lips are sealed.

Where the accused is really guilty, what an
inestimable advantage and swift short cut to
justice would arise from, a severe raking cross-
examination. How would those artfully-
concocted defences which prisoners on trial for
murder put forward, through the mouths of
others, be utterly crumbled away under this
efficacious test of truth. The grand system of
manufactured alibis would melt away; for
these being now presented to counsel through
the medium of witnesses whose antecedents they
are mostly unacquainted with, and whose
preceding and concomitant actions they know little
of, are very difficult to expose. But a false alibi
is after all but an artificial system of facts, and
which must of necessity be at variance with the
real system. So that, if the points at variance
can be discovered and proved, it must break
down.

It will be felt as to the cases of Palmer and
Smethurst what a valuable auxiliary this would
have been to the prosecution. But it will be
said again that, in the case of a person on trial
for his life, the temptation to perjury will be
irresistible, and that at all risks he will try to
"swear himself" out of his horrible position.
To this the simple answer is, that such a statement
would not be made to depend on the credit
of the prisoner, which would be sadly impeached
by his situation, and that, therefore, no oath
would be received from him. Any force to be
derived from his statement would rest on its own
natural probability, and on proper and reasonable
appearance of corroboration. Many innocent
persons, it will be said, may be unfairly
dealt with in a severe cross-examination, and
may, from nervousness and timidity, conduct
themselves so as to have all the exterior deportment
of guilt. But the same objection will
apply to civil investigations, where the practice
is not found to work such mischief; and
the judge is at hand, in case of any such misapprehension,
to restore the proper tone and appreciation.
There is never any fear, in an English
trial, of the process of the court pressing too
severely on an accused. It deals with him
too tenderly. After all, even in the case of
an innocent man finding himself in the dock,
there must be present, if not guilt, a certain
laches or carelessness, or indirect culpability of
some sort, which has brought him there; and
for this he must pay a little penalty. Thus, if