that the prosecutor introduces the case with an
opening address. Such an address is out of
order at inferior courts-martial, and, whenever
allowed, it is to be confined to a statement of
the facts to be set forth in evidence, with
reasonable certainty of proof.

All evidence is sworn, and it is usually against
rule to allow a witness to tell what he has to
say in the form of simple narrative. Information
is to be taken by question and answer; each
question being written down before or
immediately after it is put, and the reply which has
been waited for, being also carefully written
down as it is delivered. The prosecutor
examines in chief. The prisoner cross-examines.
Lastly, the court re-examines. At the Aldershott
court-martial the prisoner was allowed to
establish a precedent of reserving his cross-examination
to the day following the examination in
chief, in order that his lawyers might have the
amplest time for advising him as to the way of
shaking any serious points in the evidence that
had been given. Only one witness is in court
at a time. Commencing at ten o'clock in the
morning, courts-martial must, by the articles of
war, adjourn at four. If evidence have been
taken after the legal hour, it must be legalised
by repetition when the court next meets.

The prosecution being closed, the prosecutor,
or Judge-Advocate, declares the fact, which is
recorded. The prisoner is then asked when he
will be prepared to enter upon his defence?
If a few days' delay be asked, they are not
refused. The prisoner usually begins by
examination of his witnesses to facts, and
witnesses to character; he may also put in letters
from distant witnesses on proof of handwriting,
and may then ask for a day to complete his
written defence, or defer till that time a request
for adjournment. The prisoner is not obliged
to read it himself if there be reason why he
should have it read for him. If evidence
as to new matter have been improperly
admitted by the court, the prosecution may—in
the army, not in the navy—claim to reply, and
a reply introducing other fresh evidence may
establish a prisoner's right to rejoinder. But
the trial being in the usual manner finished with
the defence, the prosecutor, or Judge-Advocate,
sums up: not by giving any of his own opinions
on the case, but by pointing out where evidence
is contradictory or ill supported. The court, of
which the members have been taking such notes
as they wished, is then cleared for deliberation,
and examines evidence, with the Judge-Advocate's
help in referring to the different points in
the evidence. The Judge-Advocate finally asks
the decision of each member, beginning with the
youngest and ending with the President, as to
the guilt or innocence of the prisoner upon each
charge. If the whole finding of the majority be
Not Guilty, there are added the words "and he
is acquitted." If the finding be Guilty, it
becomes the business of the Judge-Advocate to
point out the article of war, or other military law,
that relates to the punishment. If there be
fifteen officers in the court-martial, eight must
consent to the sentence finally pronounced; but
in charges of murder, two-thirds must agree to
the finding of guilt, and two-thirds of the court
must agree whenever sentence of death is
pronounced.

The court may by a majority, for reasons
stated, recommend a prisoner to mercy. The
Commander-in-Chief, on the other hand, may
refuse to confirm either the finding or the
sentence, and may send the case back for revision,
the Judge-Advocate-General stating by letter
the grounds of his disapproval. The court then
reassembles, and adheres to or revises its former
finding and sentence.

That is the system which experience has
proved to be most unsatisfactory in practice.
At the late trial of Captain Robertson, of the
Fourth Dragoon Guards, officers contradicted
each other upon oath for upwards of a month,
and when, in defiance of truth and justice,
Captain Robertson was cashiered, the sentence
would have been carried into effect, had it not
been for the public press. The issue was
more creditable in another case of a dead
set on a man who was disliked by his
colonel. A Lieutenant Hyder, of the Tenth
Hussars, was brought to a general court-martial
in March, 1846, to answer certain charges
preferred against him by his commanding-officer.
It came out on that court-martial, that a system
of intimidation and injustice had been carried
on, which was unequalled even in the affair of the
Fourth Dragoon Guards. Lieutenant Hyder's
horses were repeatedly cast as being unfit for
chargers; he was not allowed to have charge of
a troop; he was annoyed in every possible
manner. The whole affair was so clear even to
the court, that there was no miscarriage of
justice, and Lieutenant Hyder was acquitted,
and his colonel reprimanded in a General Order
from the Commander-in-Chief.

Another celebrated general court-martial was
held at Nottingham in 1849. The Third Dragoon
Guards, then lying there, were all confined to
barracks by order of the commanding-officer, because
he alleged that the horses were not clean. The
men broke out of barracks by twenties. Pickets
were sent after them, but the pickets joined the
absentees. An inquiry was made into the matter,
and some of the culprits were tried, and received
various punishments, ranging from two years' to
three months' imprisonment. The public press,
when treating of the evidence given by the
witnesses for the prosecution, said that "in a
civil court the greater part of the witnesses
would have been convicted of perjury." Trust
goes by rank. The worst feature in all courts-martial
is, that unless the witnesses produced by
the prisoner be of a higher military grade than
those brought forward by the prosecution, his
chance is a poor one. In many cases, officers
have been actually ordered by their commanding-officers
to convict, on the plea that even if the
man were innocent, it would be prejudicial to the
interests of the service to acquit him. With
this feeling many commanding-officers award
punishment. Once a private soldier averred that