members of the court are said to be both judges and
jurors; but, in truth, are really jurors, with a
president for judge. There is a military prosecutor,
a military judge-advocate, or deputy judge-advocate,
who is like the civil attorney-general, and
should keep the court " straight " as to matters
of their law; but behind the scenes is the
real puller of the wires, the judge-advocate-
general, under whose directions the charges are
framed, and who " advises proofs "—to use a
Iegal phrase. It is affirmed again and again in
all the military books, that no civil assistance can
be recognised by the courts in any of their
proceedings. Lawyers who are " brought in " are
told again and again indirectly, and almost
contemptuously, that the court can have neither
ears nor eyes for them; and yet, with an absurd
inconsistency, the centre of the whole rests
on civil guidance, takes its very inspiration
from the profession so tabooed, and an eminent
barrister and member of parliament watches
over the proceedings, and takes care that all
is legal and regular. But the eminent
barrister and member of parliament is not present
during the court, and is represented by deputy;
and here, again, the system shows a great and
glaring defect. These officials can have but little
experience, and pretend to have no training. A
really important trial, always embarrassed by
questions and " points " as serious as those in
a criminal court, occurs very rarely; meaner
cases present no " points," and are of no
practical use as training. A great case suddenly
arises. An officer is suddenly thrust upon the
complex duties of examining, objecting to the
reception of evidence, speaking—all new to
him—and the principles of which duties are
not to be picked up from books. The result
must be an exhibition of hopeless floundering,
unless, as in the instance of some recent
" Fenian" courts-martial at Dublin, in the case
of an officer of more than customary efficiency
and intelligence.

But it is usual to allow the prisoner the
assistance of " counsel:" a favour that is, in truth,
no favour, as it would be a hardship to refuse
to any one in his situation the right of conferring
or whispering with a friend; and as the
court cannot tolerate the presence of a wig and
gown, and has not instinct enough to appreciate
any other more secret " note " of the barristerial
character, this " friend " cannot be
assumed to belong to that proscribed order.
But the result of the introduction of this
element makes an important difference. Besides
the actual value of their assistance, counsel
are not inclined to leave behind them the common
shifts and tricks of their profession, and
the result is a hopeless muddle, and more hopeless
mystification of the whole case; these legal
cuttle-fishes, if they can do no more, striving to
get their clients away in a black cloud. In
great cases, therefore, the authorities, not wishing
to be taken at a disadvantage, bring in their
counsel; the deputy-judge-advocate has his, and
the prosecutor his; and the whole battle is then
fought in ambush.

There is clearly something false in all this,
and sometimes the falsity is brought to a
crucial test in a rather amusing way, as in the
Fenian trial just alluded to; when one of the
court unguardedly said that " the counsel" had
suggested an improper question to the prisoner;
counsel were not slow to avail themselves of
this recognition, seized on the vantage ground
thus offered, vociferated at the president,
demanded and obtained apologies, and were not
only seen and heard by the court that could not
see or hear them, but made their presence felt in a
very inconvenient way. The drollest part of the
whole is, that a counsel thus employed is known
to Soldiers' Law as "amicus curiæ !" A ludicrous
misnomer, as all the world knows: an amicus
curiæ being an adviser of the court, and not of
the prisoner.

There is some reform wanted here, and in
an age which is striving to shake itself free
of " shams," this " blind" should be got rid
of speedily. The question is, how? There
could be found a very simple remedy. It
must be conceded that lawyers have no business
in such tribunals. They are in a false
and even undignified position, and before a
tribunal which in most instances can hardly
apprehend the value of the "points" they
make. There should be separate provinces.
Law should keep to law, and soldiering to
soldiering. There is a " staff college " now in
existence which is supposed to be the fountain of
training and intellect for the British army.
This college has its professors and schools, and
furnishes science to officers. It would be easy,
surely, to have a recognised department for
military law—say a professor—and a course
and examination. Any one who passed with
distinction should be considered as a sort of
military barrister, and kept ready " on the
staff," like other officers of attainments who
have passed through corresponding courses.
This would be matter of detail; but it would
be a basis and groundwork for reform. The
next step would be more important. From this
class should the president, judge-advocates, and
prosecutors, be selected; and it would be advisable
to have these officers always in readiness,
so that on any court-martial taking place in the
United Kingdom, an experienced and trained
staff of officials should be sent over from the
college; just as the Crown in important cases
sends " down" the attorney or solicitor general,
or some important official. In this way, from
long practice, the "business" would soon be
learnt. So, too, in the prisoner's case; he
should not be prevented from having any
assistance he may choose to have: but the court
might be allowed to assign him an experienced
military barrister.

Thus would grow up a settled system, which is
sadly wanted. The professed system of any military
investigation is "to hear the whole truth,"
everything that can be said, and everything that
any one has to say. Talk with any officer on the
matter, and he will take a pride ininsisting on this
view: " We do not care for law; justice is our