"Her Majesty's Government," indeed,
"expect" that your British consul "will exercise
great caution in using the large powers
confided to him;" but, lest this language should
seem a little rough, "Her Majesty's Government"
courteously adds that it "will always
be disposed to place the best construction"
on a consul's conduct, "and will make all
due allowance for the errors into which he
may inadvertently fall."

Now, all this is very polite and pretty; but
not quite right. Persons should not be employed
in responsible posts who are at all likely to
fall into errors which may be avoided;
and they should be punished if they do
so. It is not sufficient for "Her Majesty's
Government" to "trust that powers so extensive
will be used with prudence and moderation."
It is their imperative duty to provide
that they shall not be otherwise used, by
appointing them to be wielded by proper and
efficient persons, learned in the laws they
are called upon to administer.

I can recall several instances of consuls, in the
Levant alone, who have been bankrupt traders.
I attach no ungenerous shame to the mere fact
of a man's having been, at some time in his
life, a bankrupt trader; but I think we have a
right to insist that a man who was unable to
attend satisfactorily to his own affairs, shall not
be entrusted with those of the public. The rest
of the consuls it is needless to say, in the Levant,
as well as elsewhere, have received their
appointments through patronage, and I cannot, at
this moment, remember a distinguished
name among them. White gloves and
pedigrees are not wanted in the consular service;
we have already too many of them elsewhere.
We want plain, sensible men, who have been
brought up to the business—not persons who
have taken to it because they have failed in
other occupations; and no considerable place
should ever be confided to a man who has not
given some public and obvious proofs of his
capacity. What are commonly called "snug
berths" should be rewards for hard work, or
premiums to able men. They should not be
gratuities to idlers, whose only qualification
is that of having toadied or worried some
person of influence.

I would be clearly understood as by no means
wishing to lessen the powers confided to
consuls in the present state of Turkey; but we
ought to have a better guarantee for their
proper use. No man left perfectly alone
should ever have much power in his hands,
for all are alike liable to failure or to human
weakness.

Firstly, it seems to me that all
consuls should be required to have a thorough
knowledge of the laws and language of the
country to which they may be sent, as well as
of their own. This is not requiring a very
high standard of education for appointments
so well paid and responsible. It should be
further ordered that no interpreters should
be employed in consulates, but such as
thoroughly understand English. I would
suggest, also, that they be officially paid, and
that they be nominated by the crown.

The interpreter, cancelier, or dragoman,
for he has all these names, might be made a
very valuable officer in a consulate. He might
control any misconduct of a consul,
completely. He is a sort of justice's clerk; he
manages all affairs with the local authorities;
the whole business of his consulate
passes through his hands. He is the guide,
philosopher, and friend, the tongue and ears,
of his consul.

In French consulates, therefore, the
cancelier has distinct important functions; while
we, who delight to throw all power, might,
majesty, and money into the hands of one
man, do not even pay or acknowledge him.
The British cancelier is usually a gaunt,
hungry young man, rather out at elbows, who
has been, at some time or other, servant to
the consul or his friend, and whose bread and
character usually depend on his pleasing a
man who may be, or may not be, little better
than a blockhead.

The French cancelier, among other
duties, is bound, under fine, to register and
transmit to the Secretary of State any
complaint made to him against the consul. A
French consul may be cited before his
cancelier, and even judged. Your British
consul, however can only be compared to the
King of the Cannibal Islands, and there is no
present remedy against him.

The property and deposits of French
subjects are kept in a strong box with two locks
to it. One remains in the possession of
the consul; the other is kept by the
cancelier. Neither can go alone to finger other
people's money unperceived. But British
consulates are subject to no regulations
on this matter; and a most disgraceful case
has lately occurred of one of our officers having
dishonoured our flag by the embezzlement of
some six hundred pounds of poor people's
money. The affair became, indeed, publicly
notorious, and he was dismissed; but I am
unable to perceive that this makes the existing
state of things any better.

I am not setting up the French service as a
model, for I think many of their arrangements
both intricate and inconvenient. I am
simply trying to suggest a few practical hints.

I am now also going to touch upon a very
tender question. It is that of fees; and I say
they ought to be abolished. The proper salaries
of consuls would be much better provided for
at home by special taxes, than by allowing such
a crying abuse to go on any longer. For what
happens? Nine times in ten the consul
himself does not deign to touch his fees, and he
hands them over to somebody who very often
touches too much. They afford a premium to
delays and vexations in civil suits brought
before consuls; and they often occasion
serious altercations with sea-captains, who
are disposed to pay less and to charge their