pleadings of that action were, firstly, that the
defendant was not guilty of the infringement
complained of; secondly, that the plaintiff
was not the first inventor of the improvements
for which he had obtained the patent;
thirdly, that the nature of the invention was
not sufficiently described by the specification;
fourthly, that the invention had been practised,
used or vended before the date of
the patent; fifthly, that the defendant had
the leave and license of the plaintiff to
use the invention. Action tried in June,
1844, and verdict found for Heath upon all
the issues.

As a matter of humanity we warn all
readers at this point of the story to draw in a
long breath. There is no rest to be had even
in the reading of a course of law. Mr. Heath
having obtained his verdict filed a Bill in
Chancery against defendant, praying that
defendant might be restrained by injunction
from infringement of the patent; praying also
for an account of the profits that had been
derived from that illegal course. In the
following Michaelmas Term the defendant
moved for a rule to show cause why the
verdict on the plea of not guilty should
not be entered for him, or for a new trial
on the ground of misdirection. The
application came on for argument on the
twentyfirst of November, in the midst of gloom
and fog; and, after a lengthened discussion,
the Court of Exchequer postponed giving
judgment.

All this happened eight or nine years ago;
and, as the litigation is not over yet, or likely
we fear to be over until the Heath family is
extinct and Sheffield has become a place for
owls, it may be supposed that the judges of
the Court of Exchequer have not done
considering. Perhaps not. On the llth of
January, 1845, it came again to the
defendant's turn to have a verdict, on the ground
that "there was no intention to imitate the
patented invention, and that the judges did not
think that the defendant could be considered
guilty of any indirect infringement if he did
not intend to imitate at all." In March, 1847,
upon a motion being made before the
Vice-Chancellor, that worthy expressed himself in
terms of dissatisfaction with the law as laid
down by the judges of the Court of
Exchequer, and directed that a new action should
be brought in one of the Common Law-courts
at Westminster.

An action was brought, in the court of
Common Pleas, and the defendants—who
were attacked now by a compact host of
witnesses, and a ripe case—had some thought
of dropping the contest; but it was suggested
to them, by an able legal firm, that they
should obtain a special jury; as, by so doing,
they could create the delay of about another
twelvemonth. The delay was effected, and the
action was at last tried before Mr. Justice
Cresswell and a special jury, in the court of
Common Pleas, at the sittings after Michaelmas
Term, 1850, again in the congenial
November month. The plaintiff made out his
case (of which the moral justice, it should be
remembered, never seems to have been
doubted by judge or jury), the defendant
relied on the judgment of Exchequer, which
had been objected against by the
Vice-Chancellor. Mr. Justice Cresswell, mindful of
the etiquette of the bench, declared that he
could not, sitting singly, confirm or reverse
the judgment of the Exchequer; but he would
direct the jury to find for the defendant, and
the plaintiff would, of course, bring the whole
case before a competent tribunal.

The mockery of law! which after grinding
and grating upon a man's heart, year
after year for eight years; tossing him on a
bed of thorns while his case was being argued
and re-argued, heard and re-heard in court
after court advises him to bring the whole
case before a competent tribunal! Where is
there such a thing as a competent tribunal
in England, as the law now works? Mr.
Heath was, by this time, suffering under
heart disease, brought on by the anxieties
of litigation. But was he to give up his
splendid claims? His claims were just, and
his rights were of great money value; yet he
would have done better to abandon all hope
of attaining them while there was the desert
of the law between him and his land of pro-
mise; a desert trackless, fruitless, full of the
dry bones of men who have died miserably
while endeavouring to cross it.

The verdict in the Court of Common Pleas,
being founded on the recommendation of a
judge, sitting alone, to bring the whole case
before a "competent tribunal," litigation was
continued. It was felt that even the
favourable judgment of the whole court could not
be conclusive, as the Courts of Exchequer and
Common Pleas are courts of concurrent
jurisdiction. It was therefore determined,
by the advice of three eminent counsel, to
proceed with a writ of error.

The Great Exhibition was at that time in
preparation. Mr. Heath procured a stall in
it, and arranged with his own hand his rare
metallurgical specimens; but, before the great
show was opened, and before his weary cause
came again to be argued, his weary heart
ceased beating. He died.

At this point we stop the story in its course
to take on board fresh stores of meditation,
and to inquire whether the patent was not
in some degree the cause of Mr. Heath's
death? Already, we suspect, ninety per cent
of all the patentees who read these pages
with a just foreboding, feel that so it must
have been.

Do inventors as a class make profit by the
acquisition of exclusive rights? When certain
modifications of the patent laws, that were
considered necessary for the protection of
exhibitors in the year 1851 were discussed in
Parliament, the whole question of the laws
themselves was agitated among patentees.