both sworn to their opponent's specification.
No doubt if they had been left to tell their
respective stories in their own way, without
the worrying of counsel, they would not have
been confused, and would have given clear and
distinct evidence. The case was eventually
decided upon the personal inspection of the
opposing machines by the members of the
jury, who thus, after all, acted the part of
Tribunals of Commerce.

I remember another circumstance which
still more forcibly illustrates the folly of
flinging every dispute into a court of law
when a reference to a tribunal of practical
men would arrange the difference on the
moment, and for the merest shadow of costs.
A City merchant had purchased a number of
cases of foreign goods,— I believe maccaroni.
Many, on being weighed and examined, were
found to be no more than half full. A hole
was discovered in these cases, and much of
the maccaroni had been bitten to pieces, so
that there could be no doubt but that the
damage had been caused by mice. But who
was to bear the loss? Certainly not the purchaser,
who had bargained for full cases and
sound maccaroni. The importer declared that
the mice must have attacked the goods while
on the wharf in Thames Street; it being
impossible his agents abroad should have
shipped the animals along with the goods.
On the other hand the wharfinger protested
that there was not such a thing as a mouse
to be found upon his premises; which he had
been at great cost to have made mouse-tight.

Each party was resolute. The case was placed
in the hands of "eminent lawyers," and there
was every prospect of somebody having to pay
handsomely in addition to the value destroyed
by the mice. By great good luck the two
disputants encountered each other one day
on 'Change; and, happening to relate the
matter with some bitterness to a third person,
they were assured by him that, if they chose,
they could settle the affair in ten minutes
between themselves, by only taking a common-sense
view of the case. He pointed out
to them the certainty that the direction in
which the mice-holes were gnawed would
clearly indicate whether the animals had
entered the boxes whilst lying on the wharf,
or whether they had been imported in
them; which might have occurred from the
boxes having been left open at the port of
shipment after packing. The intruders could
not have got in during the voyage; for, except
in a few coasting vessels, mice are never
found, as they have insuperable objections to
sea-sickness. The whole question was;— did
the mice eat their way into the boxes or did
they eat their way out of them? If they were
Italian mice, packed in with the maccaroni,
which had eaten their way through the case
for air, the holes would be gnawed and jagged
within, and smooth without; if they were
English mice, with a taste for maccaroni
which deal boards could not baulk, the outside
of the holes would bear the marks of
teeth, and the inside would be smooth. The
matter appeared so simple, when viewed in
this light, that both parties agreed to adjust
their dispute by the appearance of the holes
in the cases. They did so within ten minutes
of that time; and not only saved hundreds of
pounds, but preserved their former friendly
feeling, which, had the law-suit gone on,
would no doubt have been completely at an
end.

A thousand similar instances could be adduced
to demonstrate the soundness of the
views entertained by those who are at the present
moment using their best exertions to promote
the formation of Tribunals of Commerce
in this country. Commercial differences, and
many others of a similar character, cannot be
met by the common law of the land: they
require something more than a mere definition
of legal rights for their proper adjustment.
Even were it always possible for lawyers to
conduct and decide upon such cases, the
delay involved is frequently much more
damaging than the costliness of the proceedings:
often indeed so ruinous that a
commercial man will prefer submitting to
any amount of injustice rather than be
involved in the delay, the vexations, and the
spoliation of a law-suit. A case which was
heard and argued at no more remote period
than this last August is well worthy of attention;
inasmuch as it does something more
than support the arguments, already strong,
in favour of practical common sense tribunals
for practical common sense cases. It shows
how completely the most eminent men of
science, the most accomplished students, the
deepest philosophers, may differ upon a point
of practical chemistry or geology. The trial
took place in Edinburgh, before the lord
president and a jury, as to whether a certain
mineral substance found in certain lands in
Scotland was or was not coal. It appeared
that the plaintiff had leased some land to
the defendant on certain terms of royalty,
for the purpose of digging for coal. The
latter had succeeded in turning up very large
quantities of a black inflammable substance
richly impregnated with hydrogenous gas,
and, as such, very valuable for gas-works,
although not so suitable for ordinary fuel.
The speculation became, in consequence, unexpectedly
remunerative to the workers; and
mortifying in proportion to the proprietor;
who, beholding the huge mine of wealth
opened by others on his land, brought the
action to try whether— as the right he had
leased away was solely and exclusively the
exploitation of coal— the substance dug up
by the lessees was, or was not, coal; for, if
not coal, they had no right to it. The
plaintiff, therefore, by his counsel maintained
that the mineral worked by the defendant
was not coal; and, although he was not prepared
to say what it really was in ordinary
language, he called a legion of professors of