NARRATIVE OF PARLIAMENT AND POLITICS

In the HOUSE OF LORDS on Thursday, February 24,
the Earl of ELLENBOROUGH, in putting a question
respecting a letter from the Secret Committee of the
Court of Directors of the East India Company to the
governor-general of India in Council, dated in September
1829, took a review of the causes and conduct of
the War with Ava. In 1829 he was president of the
Board of Control, and all his information on the War
in Ava then recent he placed before the late Duke
of Wellington, in order that he might obtain his
authoritative instructions as to the line of operations
to be followed in the event of another war. The Duke
gave his views in detail, and they were sent out to
India in the despatch to which his question referred.
Now he believed that the course of operations recently
adopted by the government of India was not that
described by the Duke of Wellington; because the
Duke never would have sanctioned the employment of
troops on the internal waters of a great empire without
animals and means of movement. After the relief of
Pegu, General Godwin collected twenty-five carts, and
marched twenty-four miles in three days, driving the
enemy before him; but he was obliged to return because
a provision cart broke down. It was impossible to
subdue an empire with troops so ill-provided. He
knew we had compelled the Emperor of China to submit
to terms with very limited means of carriage; but even
there, in spite of all our successes, no impression was
made until we brought all our force to bear on the
mouth of the Great Canal. Have we the same means
of success in Ava? Or if there were, could we expect
to produce the same effect on the barbarous sovereign of
a barbarous people? Had we rested our forces on the
provinces of Arracan, placed 8000 men at nearly equal
distances on the Irrawaddy between Ava and Rangoon,
with perfect means of movement, we should have had a
better chance of success. What is the present position
of the army in that part of India? He calculated, that
by the 4th of January, General Godwin would be at
Prome with 4800 men, of whom 200 would be cavalry,
and 16 guns, of which not more than 10 would be horsed.
There is no trace of any provision for moving ammunition
or provisions. Out of the 4800 men, as the soldiers
were dying, six, eight, ten a day, from cholera, one-
fifth were in the hospital. This, with 500 as a guard
for the sick, left the movable army at 3500 men.
Before they could get to the enemy on the left bank of
the river, they must take six miles of stockades,
supported in the rear by three immense stockades, and in
front by two miles and a half of jungle. How can it be
expected that these forces, limited in amount, and seriously
affected by sickness, would be able at last to march on
Ava, "as was the dream of those who look at the subject
from a distance?" Then we had 500 men, without a
commissariat, employed in making a road for the
passage of animals over the pass that leads from Arracan
to the Irrawaddy; but we had allowed the pass to be
strongly fortified, instead of taking possession of it on
the first day of the war. We had fewer than 3500 men
at Rangoon; and in consequence of the "unfortunate"
occupation of Pegu, not a man could be spared from the
lower part of the river as a reinforcement. Yet this
was the chosen moment when we "declared annexed,
the province of Pegu, which we did not occupy, and
intimated our intention, if our proposals were not
acceded to, of moving upon Ava! " That was a very
grandiloquent proclamation; but, unfortunately, there
did not exist a force sufficient to enable us to carry it
into execution. Why should we annex the province of
Pegu at all? And if we do, can we stand there?
Pegu has no frontier, no range of mountains, not the
slightest line of demarcation. If we annex Pegu, we
must annex Ava. In either case, considerable additions
must be made to our forces; yet the annexation of Ava
would bring no military advantages. In conclusion,
Lord Ellenborough said, that when he remembered
the great expense, the extensive operations, with our
honour pledged by "that unfortunate proclamation" to
dethrone a sovereign—when he remembered that the
original pretexts put forward in justification were "two
little injuries inflicted on British subjects"—"two
little insults," as they were called—when he remembered
that the whole amount of the original damage
was said to be £900, and considered how the Burmese
might have felt insulted at the presence of five of our
ships in the river—he confessed it was "painful to see
the great and lamentable consequences which had arisen
from a cause so small." The king of Ava did not
desire war; the notion of acting hostilely had never
entered his head: former governments had avoided
collisions. Lord Ellenborough desired to hear, if
possible, the views of the government on our position with
regard to the government of Ava, and in what manner
we can best extricate ourselves.—The Earl of
ABERDEEN said, that although it has never been
customary to produce any despatch of the Secret
Committee, he was not disposed to withhold the paper now
asked for. It was written twenty-five years ago, and much
may have happened to render completely inappropriate
any line of conduct prescribed in a despatch of so old a
date: although it would possess historical interest, he
thought it of little practical utility. He was likewise
prepared to produce papers explanatory of the war,
including the proclamation, and also an account of the
expense already incurred. The ministers, he continued,
did not feel called upon to discuss in any manner the
propriety of the measures which have taken place.
They had great reliance on the discretion, judgment,
and experience of Lord Dalhousie. With the most
pacific intentions, every governor-general had found
himself engaged more or less in war. Lord Dalhousie
had been led by the necessities of the case to extend the
sphere of his warlike operations; and he had reluctantly
adopted annexation. "The present government (said
Lord Aberdeen) are strangers to the whole of the
policy and execution of that war up to the present time.
Her Majesty's late government, I apprehend, gave
their general approbation to that policy and to the
conduct of the war. In general terms, I acquiesce in
the opinion which has been expressed by the late
government upon the subject, and in the eulogies which
were passed by them upon the governor-general."—
After a speech from the Earl of Derby, in which he
defended the policy of his own government in regard to
the present question, the papers were ordered.

On Friday, Feb. 25, the Earl of ELLENBOROUGH
presented a Petition from the Native and other inhabitants
of the Madras territory, complaining of grievances,
and asking fur relief from excessive and oppressively-
raised taxation, public works, reformed finance,